Background Avahan is a large-scale, HIV preventive intervention, targeting high-risk populations in south India. We assessed the cost-eff ectiveness of Avahan to inform global and national funding institutions who are considering investing in worldwide HIV prevention in concentrated epidemics.
Introduction
More than 2 million people are living with HIV in India. 1 The epidemic is concentrated and predominantly driven by high-risk groups, particularly female sex workers (FSWs) and their clients, men who have sex with men (MSM), and, in some contexts, injecting drug users. 2 The Avahan programme, the Indian AIDS initiative of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, was one of the largest HIV prevention programmes targeted at highrisk groups worldwide. Avahan operated across six Indian states and had a funding commitment of US$258 million between 2004 and 2009. 3 Avahan was implemented through state lead partners, who contracted a plethora of local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at the district level. From Avahan's inception, rigorous evaluation has been an integral part of the programme, 4 including the assessment of costeff ectiveness.
Avahan has been shown to be eff ective in the reduction of HIV transmission. In an evaluation that used a combination of detailed biobehavioural surveys and mathematical modelling in a subset of 22 of 83 total districts where it was implemented, medium to strong evidence of eff ect was reported in most districts modelled, especially those with less condom use in commercial sex at the start of the intervention. 5, 6 Avahan averted 42% of all HIV infections during 4 years, corresponding to 68 000 (95% credibility interval 32 000-202 000) cases averted in 22 modelled districts. In 10 years, this number increased to 214 000 (99 000-373 000), representing 57% of HIV infections averted. Geographical extrapolation by use of a statistical regression model to all Avahan districts showed that 202 000 HIV infections were averted in 4 years, increasing to 606 000 HIV infections averted in 10 years. 6 However, Avahan also incurred substantial costs. 7 Hence, HIV policy makers need to know whether the programme was also cost eff ective to inform decisions about making sizeable investments in HIV prevention at scale in other similar settings, especially at a time when HIV programmes are facing increasing demands on their scarce resources. So far, few robust studies have investigated the cost-eff ectiveness of HIV prevention targeted at high-risk groups, with only a handful done in Asia. 8 The most comprehensive estimate so far suggested a potential incremental cost per DALY averted of US$10. 9, 7 However, great uncertainty remains around these predictions, with a 30% chance that HIV prevention for FSWs would not be cost eff ective. 9, 7 Several small project-based studies also suggest that cost-eff ectiveness could be achieved. [10] [11] [12] However, these studies exclude the costs of the substantial eff ort associated with large-scale implementation. 10 Previous studies also did not have the benefi ts of extensive target population surveys, did not use dynamic eff ect estimates, excluded heterogeneity in FSW risk behaviour, and did not fi t the eff ect model to time trends in HIV prevalence. 11, 12 In view of this evidence gap and the increasing scarce resources for HIV prevention, we did a large-scale economic evaluation of Avahan to examine whether HIV prevention for high-risk groups could achieve cost-eff ectiveness in the real world and at scale, and whether it should thus be sustained as a priority investment for global public health.
Methods

Study design
We estimated the cost-eff ectiveness of Avahan from a provider perspective. Our primary measure is the incremental cost eff ective ratio (ICER), comparing the incremental cost per DALY averted versus a no-Avahan counterfactual base case. Secondary measures include incremental cost per HIV infection averted and incremental cost per person reached.
We classifi ed HIV prevention as cost eff ective a priori if the incremental cost per DALY averted was less than the gross domestic product (GDP) per head in 2011 (US$1500). 13 HIV prevention was classifi ed as cost saving if the costs of antiretroviral treatment (ART) during the lifetime of the cohort of individuals exposed to HIV prevention during the fi rst 4 years of the programme outweighed the costs spent in the fi rst 4 years of the programme. Our primary ICER and cost-savings estimates assume that all future costs and DALYS averted are discounted at a 3% rate.
Programme and study setting
We evaluated HIV prevention activities in 22 with HIV remains high, with Andhra Pradesh having 500 000 people living with HIV followed by Maharashtra (420 000), Karnataka (250 000), and Tamil Nadu (150 000) in 2011. 14 The Avahan programme contracted grantees at the state level (state lead partners) to work with grass-root NGOs to deliver a package of services to both FSW and MSM populations in these states. 3, 15 The standard package implemented by NGOs includes peer-led outreach, education and condom distribution, free treatment of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) through projectoperated clinical services or through preferred service providers, free commodity supplies (condoms, STI drugs), and facilitation of community mobilisation. Peer educators promoted condom use and attendance at clinics, and encouraged follow-up and partner treatment. Clinics provided treatment for STIs, referred clients to other clinical services, including HIV and tuberculosis testing, or both, and provided HIV treatment and care. Additional grantees did other activities such as capacitybuilding, social marketing, trucker programmes, national-level and state-level advocacy, and knowledgebuilding activities, across each state and nationally. 3, 16 
Cost estimation
The UNAIDS Costing Guidelines for HIV Prevention Strategies were taken as the basis for the costing method. 17 Economic costs were estimated for every organisation level: NGO, state lead partners, and the national programme offi ce for every year between 2004 and 2008 in all 22 districts, as part of a larger study into 68 districts across the four Indian states. A full description of methods and the presentation of the cost data used are publicly available. 7 We did not cost the no-Avahan counterfactual because of insuffi cient data availability at baseline. This approach implicitly assumes that the full cost of Avahan was required to achieve the diff erences in condom use achieved by Avahan over and above the counterfactual base case. To aid comparability with other studies, our results are presented in two categories: NGO costs (costs incurred at the NGO level only) and programme costs, including costs incurred at the state lead partners and national level (these include activities such as programme management, expertise enhancement [capacity building], and community supply costs).
Total and unit costs were estimated with data for expenditure, resource use, and activity that were obtained from routine reporting, and from staff records and interviews during the period 2004-08. Details of donated goods and services were collected from every district and were valued at market prices. Start-up and training costs were annualised during the lifetime of the project (assumed to be 5 years). The start-up period was defi ned as project inception until the start of service delivery to the target population. Costs of the evaluation and research activities were excluded.
Personnel costs covered the salaries and expenses of all staff , including peer educators, volunteers, and shared resource personnel. Peer educator time was valued at the honorarium paid, except when not paid. In the latter case, and for other volunteers, time costs were valued using self-reported average earnings or, if unemployed, the payment made to peers in interventions undertaken by the National Aids Control Organisation (NACO), Government of India. Condom costs (where provided to the programme for free) were estimated with the lowestpriced market alternative. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation costs were allocated to state lead partners according to the size of the grant during the year of analysis, on the basis of interviews with programme staff . State lead partners' costs were allocated to each of the 22 districts after extensive interviews. The fi rst stage in allocation was to apportion every cost that was reported in expenditure records as being allocated to a specifi c (or group of) NGOs. On the basis of the interviews, any remainder of costs that could be clearly associated with programme management was allocated to each NGO on an equal basis. All remaining costs (mainly those that related to service provision levels) were allocated according to estimated population size, because this was used by state lead partners to assess and approve budgetary levels for other activities. These state lead partners' costs were combined with NGO expenditures to estimate the costs of diff erent activities based on a combination of interviews, actual use, and for personnel costs on the basis of time sheets.
To estimate potential cost savings, we sourced ART costs from the literature (table 1) . Data for the costs of ART in India are insuffi cient. The costs used do not include the full cost of treatment of opportunistic infections, or costs to maintain adherence with time, and therefore it is highly likely that our estimates of cost savings are conservative.
Unit costs were calculated per number of people reached at least once in a year, measured with data from the programme management information system. The quality of management information system data developed through the time period. Although all NGOs in this studied reported key indicators from start-up in the fi rst year, data quality was not checked by any central authority. Thereafter as the system was computerised, all data were checked, and any inconsistencies were fed back to NGOs for correction. Although this was done retrospectively for the fi rst year data, staff interviewed at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation suggested there was some under-reporting in the fi rst year, and thus early unit costs might overestimate the cost per person reached. All data were converted to US$ 2011 prices with the GDP defl ator index, 27 and the average exchange rate in the year of data collection. 28 Further details of the costing methods and data (including cost breakdowns between inputs and activities) can be found in a study by Chandrashekar and colleagues. 7
Eff ect estimation
A purpose-built dynamic model of HIV/STI transmission was used to calculate HIV infections averted in FSWs, their clients, and MSM, and onward transmission to their long-term non-commercial partners, during the fi rst 4 and 10 years of the Avahan programme. 6 All 22 districts with local biobehavioural surveys were modelled separately with probabilistic sampling methods. These districts were chosen to represent the geography and sociocultural characteristics of key populations across Avahan districts, with the district with the largest known sex worker population in every sociocultural region selected. 29 Within the model, the intervention was assumed to have two eff ects that directly drive impact: increasing condom use by FSW and enhancing STI treatment in clinics. Other intervention components such as structural interventions and community mobilisation were considered to act indirectly through increasing condom use and access to STI services.
The model used was dynamic (capturing indirect population-level eff ects not included in cohort models) and was done within a Bayesian framework with detailed district-specifi c data. 30 This framework produced many parameter sets giving model fi ts to prevalence data for HIV, herpes simplex virus 2, and syphilis, providing estimates of HIV infections averted with credibility intervals. The appendix provides additional information, and full details of the parameterisation and model and fi tting methods used are described elsewhere. 6
Model inputs (values or sampling distributions)
Average duration of HIV stages (months)
Early HIV high viraemia phase
Uniform (2·0, 6·0) 18, 19 Asymptomatic HIV infection Uniform (70·0, 91·0) 18, 19 Late-stage HIV infection Uniform (6·0, 18·0) 18, 19 AIDS phase without treatment Uniform (11·6, 29·4) 18 Trends in condom use with time were derived from survey data with a historical cohort method. 31 To estimate incremental eff ect due to Avahan in the absence of a control group, a simulated counterfactual scenario based on how condom use might have changed without the intervention was considered, for which condom use was also assumed to have continued to increase during the time-period of the intervention, but at the slower preintervention rate. 5, 6 This counterfactual scenario represents an extrapolation of what would have happened without Avahan, and allows for continued non-Avahan intervention and behaviour change. It is conservative because it assumes increased condom use even without Avahan. STI treatment was also assumed to continue at preintervention levels. Multiple parameter combinations that were found to be model fi ts for the previously described intervention scenario were re-run for the counterfactual scenario to estimate the incremental infections averted, providing a range of estimates that were used in the cost-eff ectiveness analysis.
Cost-eff ectiveness analysis
We estimated ICERs for every district independently for 4 year (2004-08) and 10-year (2004-14) time periods. The costs for the 10-year period are estimated with the costs per person reached in 2008 multiplied by the numbers of people reached up until 2014. This approach implicitly assumes no major changes in terms of service intervention and commodity prices beyond general price infl ation with time. Disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs) averted were estimated from incremental infections averted generated by the eff ect model, with standard formulae and disability weights for the lifetime of the cohort of people reached during 2004-08 (appendix). Our primary estimates use no age weighting. Table 1 shows the parameters used in the cost eff ectiveness analysis, 18, 19 which correspond with those used in several other HIV prevention cost-eff ectiveness estimates for India, 12 but not the previous national-level study that estimates DALYs averted during a 20-year time horizon. 9 We also estimated cost savings from prevention of future ART costs. We assumed no additional preventive eff ect from ART, because ART coverage in high-risk groups between 2004 and 2008 was extremely low, 26 but focused on the potential cost savings in terms of future ART treatment, assuming diff erent levels of future ART coverage. Table 1 shows survival assumptions and costs of ART. Notably, although ART increases survival time (and therefore reduces the DALYs averted from prevention of HIV intervention) it also substantially increases the costs of that survival. Data for ART costs in India are insuffi cient, with most studies outdated and very little known about the costs of provision of ART to high-risk groups over a sustained period in diff erent settings. We therefore chose a wide plausible range for cost of fi rst-line treatment.
To estimate mean incremental NGO cost per DALY averted and mean incremental programme cost per DALY averted, we did a probabilistic sensitivity analysis in which we randomly sampled 50 000 combinations of all cost and DALY parameters, as well as model fi ts, using uniform distributions. We created an acceptability curve to assist policy makers to interpret the uncertainty around cost-eff ectiveness. Acceptability curves plot the probability that the intervention is cost eff ective as the willingness-to-pay threshold changes. We also did oneway sensitivity analyses for discount rates used to estimate DALYs averted (values 0%, 3%, and 8%) and future ART coverage (values 21-40% and 80%).
Role of the funding source
The funder of the study had no role in study design, data gathering, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of the report. The corresponding author had full access to all data and fi nal responsibility for the decision to submit for publication. Data are mean (SD 1·96). Dom=dominated (the intervention dominates the counterfactual where the intervention is on average less costly and more eff ective than the counterfactual. Where there is no SD reported then the intervention dominates for all estimates within SD 1·96 of the mean. The mean cost per DALY averted varied substantially by district, ranging between a mean incremental NGO cost per DALY averted of $4 and $122, and a mean incremental programme cost per DALY averted of $17 and $471. In one district (Kolhapur) where condom use was high and increasing rapidly before Avahan, the uncertainty range in the cost per DALY averted was undefi ned. In this district, condom use in the counterfactual scenario could be the same as in the intervention scenario, meaning that the number of infections averted would be zero, and hence the cost per DALY averted could be infi nite.
Results
The mean incremental programme cost per DALY averted declined to $36 when the time period was extended to 10 years, fell to $22 per DALY averted when DALYs were not discounted (table 3) , and rose to $129 at an 8% discount rate (data not shown). Inclusion of ART costs resulted in an ART cost saving (for the lifetimes of the high-risk cohort of 154 425) of $77 004 792 (compared with the $50 533 660 spent on Avahan) in the 22 districts (table 4) . Mean savings across the 22 districts that increased substantially as our assumptions about ART coverage increased (table 4 ). The fi gure shows acceptability curves to represent the uncertainty in our estimates. Figure A shows the acceptability curves across all 22 districts when ICERS in each district are assumed to have no correlation across districts. Figure B shows the acceptability curve when perfect correlation is assumed. Both results show that our estimates of cost-eff ectiveness are robust, with 100% of sampled ICERS remaining well below the willingness-to-pay threshold.
Discussion
Our results confi rm previous evidence from national models and pilot studies 9,10 suggesting that HIV prevention programmes targeted at high-risk groups at scale are cost eff ective (panel). Our estimates of incremental cost per DALY averted are substantially below the willingness-to-pay threshold and within the ranges achieved by other HIV preventive interventions. 8, 22 Our fi ndings therefore suggest that HIV prevention interventions focused on high-risk groups are good value for money in India and similar settings.
Our estimates of incremental cost per DALY averted are higher than those previously estimated for India. 11 This diff erence is, to a large extent, due to the fact that we measured costs incurred above the NGO level in our analysis. 7 These costs are important to consider because they are incremental and are likely to be a substantial component of the eff ort to scale up HIV prevention rapidly, especially in any setting where NGO capacity is weak. We also found higher numbers of clients per FSW and more baseline condom use than in previous studies, 10 and a slower rate of increase in condom use, possibly refl ecting the longer start-up period of larger scale programmes. 5 Finally, we also chose a more conservative counterfactual than in previous studies.
Although our estimates of the incremental cost per DALY averted are higher than previous studies, the greater precision surrounding our estimates (primarily due to our extensive cost data collection, the fi tting of the model, and use of in-depth local data from highquality surveys designed to parameterise the model), allows us to be more certain that targeted HIV prevention in India has been cost eff ective. The remaining uncertainty we noted is largely due to the wide credibility interval we noted around the eff ect estimates. This stems from the challenges of accurately mapping high-risk populations; the absence of baseline data for both condom use and HIV prevalence, which might be unavoidable in real-life evaluation of marginalised populations 32 and which meant that condom trends were derived with additional uncertainty; and the relatively wide range of epidemic trajectories that could fi t prevalence data at two or three timepoints.
We also noted a substantial variation in costs, eff ect, and cost-eff ectiveness by district. Although the few study sites means that statistical exploration of the drivers of this variation is challenging, complementary analyses of the costs from all Avahan districts show that both programme scope and scale are key drivers of cost variation between districts. 7 Specifi cally, ongoing analysis suggests that the way in which programmes contract out STI services, the involvement of the community, and the type of FSW reached might explain the variation of costs between districts. We also note substantial economies of scale (with no diseconomies observed at high levels of coverage). HIV prevention programmes therefore have to carefully consider the size of the NGO contracted, weighing the benefi ts of small community NGOs against the lower costs of larger NGOs that can benefi t from economies of scale. Moreover, in our modelling work, we have identifi ed several contextual factors that are likely to drive diff erences in impact at the district level, such as the baseline level of condom use, the presence of other targeted HIV interventions and the size of the sex worker population. 6 The eff ect of these contextual factors means that care should also be taken before generalisation of our fi ndings to other settings; these explanatory factors are also likely to vary by the stage of HIV epidemic and setting. Although this study confi rms that HIV prevention at scale can be highly cost eff ective and potentially cost saving, several unresolved questions remain regarding the most aff ordable model of scale-up. The costs shown here represent 22 districts, but are part of a wider costing study that has collected costs from 64 districts in India. From this broader costing study, we estimate that the annual cost of sustaining Avahan across four states is around $35 million. 7 This is a sizeable sum, but remains a small proportion of the national health budget of around $5 billion per year. 7 However, in view of recent budget cuts and the substantial disease burden in India, questions are being raised as to whether the Avahan HIV prevention model, with a high level of intensity support and community involvement, is the most cost-eff ective way forward; and whether it is possible to achieve the same eff ect with a lower scale or reduced scope of services. Further work is ongoing with the dataset we present to explore these questions, in particular to examine the eff ect of increased investment in community mobilisation on HIV prevention programme costeff ectiveness, and threshold levels of coverage required to achieve a satisfactory eff ect.
Finally, important limitations should be noted that aff ect both our economic evaluation and those of most previous studies. First, our study excluded any economic welfare benefi t to the recipients of HIV programmes by exclusion of other health and economic benefi ts, such as DALY gains from reductions in violence, reductions in the number of cases of other STIs, reduced orphanhood from HIV, and other welfare gains for the increased empowerment of high-risk group members. Second, we excluded the costs incurred by the high-risk group members themselves, such as the opportunity cost of time spent with peer educators. Although the exclusion of costs incurred by high-risk group members could mean that we have overestimated cost-eff ectiveness, these costs are likely to be small in view of the outreach nature of the Avahan programme. Third, compared with other Avahan districts, the 22 districts included in this study were more likely to have a pre-existing intervention and thus eff ect and cost-eff ectiveness might be lower than in other districts. Finally, our estimates of ART cost only included fi rst-line treatment, so are likely to underestimate the true future resource requirements of ART.
This study provides evidence, with local data from a programme delivered to scale, that the large investment in targeted HIV prevention programmes made in India during the past decade has not only had an eff ect, but has been cost eff ective. To our knowledge, our fi ndings are the best evidence so far to suggest that those responsible for HIV prevention programme development should consider sustaining and expanding investment in such programmes in India and beyond as a priority strategy for combating HIV.
Panel: Research in context
Systematic review
In 2009, a systematic review by Galarraga and colleagues 8 identifi ed that few robust studies have assessed the cost eff ectiveness of HIV prevention, with only a handful done in Asia, and that more than 25 years into the AIDS epidemic and billions of dollars of spending later, much work is still to be done both on costs and eff ectiveness to adequately inform HIV prevention planning. Since then empirical research on the cost-eff ectiveness for HIV prevention for high-risk groups has primarily either been further studies at a small scale, or has used national level data and models, requiring a large number of assumptions to be made.
Interpretation
Our work uses extensive primary data collection on costs and behavioural change in 22 districts in India, combined with a mathematical model of how this change aff ects HIV transmission, to estimate the cost-eff ectiveness of HIV prevention focused on high-risk groups at scale. It thus presents depth of empirically based estimates of cost eff ectiveness without parallel globally. Our estimates of costs per disability-adjust life-year (DALY) averted are higher than those of previous studies of targeted HIV prevention, 10 mainly because we included programme costs incurred above the service level, and noted higher numbers of clients per female sex workers, more baseline condom use, and a slower rate of increase in condom use than in previous studies. 10 However, the greater precision surrounding our estimates allows us to confi rm these previous estimates, with a robust empirical basis, and conclude that the large investment in targeted HIV prevention in India has been cost eff ective in reducing HIV infection and is highly likely to be cost saving in the long run. Individuals working in HIV programmes in concentrated epidemic settings should therefore continue to invest (or expand investment) in HIV prevention for high-risk groups.
